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The macaque washes a potato in a stream. It does this because it has seen the dirt come 
off as another macaque washed its potato, and it knows that clean potatoes taste better. 
The small child washes a plastic potato from a plastic vegetable set in a bowl of pretend-
water. The child has seen the grownups doing this at the sink. He knows it is the kind of 
thing that grownups do. At the end of the washing, the macaque will eat the potato. Its 
action is the same as that of the macaque it has observed, but it has no sense that it is 
doing the same thing as that macaque. The child will not eat his potato for he knows it is 
plastic and not for eating: it is for pretending to do what the grownups do. Both macaque 
and child are engaged in a particular action; it is only for the child, however, that this is 
also understood under a general rule, only for the child that this is understood as 
something shared: this is what grownups do, this is what we do. Without the 
understanding of such a rule, plastic vegetables would make no sense. And toys have 
their fascination partly because of their disagreement with the general concept. In fact, it 
need not have been toy vegetables at all: some rounded stones from the beach and a 
bucket or who-knows-what would have done, and in fact that would have extended the 
joke—like pretending a pencil is a toothbrush. 
It is the significance of these partly Aristotelian insights—of the relation of the 
particular to the general concept, and of the fact that the human being is to be understood 
in terms of its form, its causa formalis—that Sebastian Rödl draws out so richly in 
‘Education and Autonomy’, the preceding paper in the present discussion. The sharpness 
of his response here is provoked especially by the suggestion, in David Bakhurst and 
John McDowell, that baby human beings are ‘mere animals’, and that they are 
transformed from this state through a process of education or Bildung such that they 
become fully-fledged human beings. This constitutes an acquisition of second nature, our 
first nature being what we share with the brutes. Rödl tries to show, in response, that the 
baby is quite unlike the animal, whatever their relative abilities, in that the former has 
within it a potential that is actualised through education. The capacity for reason is there 
already in the child. It is not instilled by the teacher but actualised through the habits and 
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content that the teacher provides. And the child, however incapable it may be in the early 
months of its life, is to be understood in terms of the form of the human: a baby is a 
human in virtue of its form. Education is a process of actualisation, not transformation. 
Not to see that a potential or latent capacity for reason is part of the reality of the human 
being, just as it is of the world itself, would risk fostering, or at least, giving space to, a 
reductive naturalism. 
My contribution to this symposium begins and ends with questions that Rödl 
raises. The central part of the discussion that follows, however, considers responses to 
reductionism as these are found in the work of McDowell, the acknowledged ‘hero’ of 
Bakhurst’s The Formation of Reason.  
 
Disentangling manoeuvres 
In recent writings, Hilary Putnam (2002, 2012) has drawn attention to the influence, 
during the middle decades of the last century, that logical positivism had on thinking in 
academic and professional fields outside philosophy. Thus, in the 1930s, the economist 
Lionel Robbins advanced the view that there could be no rational justification for the 
redistribution of wealth because such a policy would be based on value judgements and 
these, as the positivists had shown, lacked ‘cognitive meaning’:  
 
In this way, the logical positivist claim that ‘Why people respond favorably to 
certain facts and unfavorably to others is [merely] a question for the sociologist’ 
(Ayer, 1954, p. 237) came to be regarded as ‘undoubtedly correct’ by a policy 
science whose recommendations affect the lives of literally billions of our fellow 
human beings. Ethical questions are the questions that most of us think it most 
important to discuss rationally and not irrationally. But if the logical positivist 
view that economists deferred to for such a long time were indeed correct, then 
the very idea of discussing value questions rationally would be (‘cognitively’) 
nonsense. (Putnam, 2102, pp. 38-39) 
 
Putnam concedes that Robbins’s adoption of this position did not prevent other 
economists from elaborating policies directed towards redistribution, but they also 
remained in the sway of positivism insofar as their case was advanced in cautiously 
conditional, means-ends judgments of the form: ‘if you have such and such values, then 
such and such is the most feasible economic policy’ (ibid.). The separation of fact and 
value, and the further assumption that values were essentially ‘subjective’, remained 
largely unchallenged. It is not difficult to see the ways that such assumptions have, in the 
decades that have followed, maintained their hold in matters of policy and practice, as 
well as in popular consciousness, in spite of the fact that within philosophy these views 
are now so widely discredited. Nor is it difficult to recognise, within educational policy 
and practice, a late flowering of verificationism in current conceptions of teaching, 
learning, and above all assessment. 
In identifying the ways the positivists’ claims have been dismantled, Putnam 
lights on the word ‘entanglement’, a notion that he finds explicit in McDowell (1988) and 
implicit in the work of Willard van Orman Quine, Morton White and others. He writes: 
‘The failure of the “disentangling manoeuvre” that was supposed to split up thick ethical 
predicates into a value-free “cognitive” component and a cognition-free “emotive” 
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component was first seen by Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch, and then further discussed . 
. . by Stanley Cavell and more recently by John McDowell and myself ’ (Putnam, 2012, 
pp. 51-52). His point in listing these names is in part to draw attention to the diversity of 
philosophical traditions from which enlightenment can come. And it is to suggest that 
philosophy does not serve itself well when it thinks of itself as a collection of 
specialisms, along the lines of medical science: ‘It is when different insights from 
different sources are connected with each other that philosophy truly educates us’ (ibid.). 
McDowell’s diagnosis of the ‘disentangling manoeuvre’ was to find fuller 
expression in his highly influential book, Mind and World (1996), based on his John 
Locke Lectures, given at Oxford in 1991. McDowell connects the project of 
disentanglement with a more pervasive ‘disenchantment’. The medical-therapeutic motif 
of ‘diagnosis’ provides an appropriate characterisation for one aspect of McDowell’s 
project, but this combines with a more spiritually charged vocabulary, which suggests 
purposes of a somewhat different, more constructive kind: there is the need to exorcise a 
certain kind of philosophical demon; and beyond this there is a move—albeit that this is 
very carefully qualified—towards a partial re-enchantment of the world. McDowell is 
clear that we should continue to regard the earlier disenchantment, which came with the 
rise of science, as an advance and, further, that we must resist any ‘crazily nostalgic 
attempt to re-enchant the natural world’ (1996, p. 76). But at the heart of his constructive 
endeavour are questions of meaning and value, and of the ways these pervade our lives 
and world, and this indicates the kind of re-enchantment that is to be entertained. This 
brings him into partial conflict with certain mainstream currents of thought within the 
philosophical tradition from which he comes, albeit that his elaboration of his position is 
framed within the fundamentally Kantian categories of that mainstream. In the section 
that follows I shall briefly sketch some main features of his approach before offering, in 
the subsequent section, a series of criticisms. On the strength of these, I shall then revisit 
the idea of enchantment, with a view both to registering the importance of McDowell’s 
project and to indicating the reasons why these are matters of some significance for 
education. 
 
McDowell and the space of reasons 
In the Afterword, Part III, to Mind and World McDowell identifies the diagnostic move 
he has proposed in the lectures as a response to a prevailing condition: ‘What I suggest is 
that our philosophical anxieties are due to the intelligible grip on our thinking of a 
modern naturalism, and we can work at loosening that grip’ (p. 177). Identifying the 
source of our difficulties may be one way of sensitising us to their recurrence, for they 
will surely recur. The recognition of anxiety is there also in the Introduction, where 
modern philosophy’s preoccupation with problems of knowledge is seen as betraying 
something else: 
 
it is helpful to see those apparent problems as more or less inept expressions of a 
deeper anxiety—an inchoately felt threat that a way of thinking we find ourselves 
falling into leaves minds simply out of touch with the rest of reality, not just 
questionably capable of getting to know about it. A problem about crediting 
ourselves with knowledge is just one shape, and not the most fundamental, in 
which that anxiety can make itself felt (pp. xiii-xiv). 
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The preoccupation with knowledge in McDowell’s book takes off from Wilfrid Sellars’s 
distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘realm of law’, the former 
characterised by relations of normative kinds, the latter by causal relations of the type 
studied in the natural sciences. Crucial to Sellars’s position are the negative implications 
of this: ‘whatever the relations are that constitute the logical space of nature, they are 
different in kind from the normative relations that constitute the logical space of reasons’ 
(p. xv). What this dichotomy opens up is a question about the nature of experience, and 
this leads to the other starting point for McDowell. This is the Kantian distinction 
between receptivity and spontaneity, where the former is a matter of the impressions 
made upon our senses in experience and the latter the freedom of thought. In his book, 
Bakhurst follows McDowell in quoting the celebrated aphorism ‘Thoughts without 
content are empty; intuition without concepts is blind’, which is to be understood in a 
way that acknowledges the complexity of this interaction and, perhaps, the impossibility 
of disentanglement. This does not dispense, however, with the need to specify more 
clearly just how it is that thought connects with experience, especially if, as in Sellars’s 
account, thought and experience are taken to operate within spaces that are logically 
distinct. In the course of the many efforts to do just this, it becomes clear that certain 
extreme positions are to be avoided—on the one hand, ‘bald naturalism’, which would 
understand everything in terms of the realm of law, and, on the other, ‘rampant 
Platonism’, which constitutes an extreme idealism. Even if one avoids such extremes, 
however, one finds oneself oscillating between, on the one hand, an emphasis on the 
structuring powers of the intellect and, on the other, an acknowledgement of the (so it 
seems) incontrovertible givenness of what is received through experience. McDowell’s 
intention is to lead us away from this oscillation. 
The main thrust of McDowell’s account is to show that the space of reasons goes 
‘all the way down’ in experience: ‘Experiences have their content by virtue of the fact 
that conceptual capacities are operative in them, and that means capacities that genuinely 
belong to the understanding: it is essential to their being the capacities they are that they 
can be exploited in active and potentially self-critical thinking’ (p. 66). The content of 
experience does not depend on the pre-conceptual deliverances of sensible experience 
upon which the understanding subsequently puts a construction; on the contrary, those 
experiences are themselves already structured by the understanding. This is explained 
further, and in more overtly ethical terms, through reference to the idea of a ‘naturalism 
of second nature’ (otherwise a ‘naturalized platonism’ (p. 91)), which draws upon 
Aristotle’s account of the way that human beings’ lives are naturally constituted by 
processes of ethical upbringing and the normative logical space into which these lead. 
The child washing plastic potatoes, we might say, is entering the space of reasons as this 
is manifested in the adult practice of washing potatoes, and the discontinuity of his 
practice with that of the adults (his potatoes are, after all, plastic), far from being simply a 
deficiency, demonstrates more fully his understanding of the general concept. Thus, in 
McDowell’s terms, one has one’s eyes opened to reasons at large by acquiring a second 
nature. The process of this acquisition is, he claims, fittingly named Bildung (p. 84)—
notwithstanding the fact that this notion remains badly underdrawn in his account. This is 
a shortcoming that Bakhurst’s book addresses and partly overcomes. 
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The necessity of Bildung helps to show the differences in sensible experience 
between human beings and other animals. While we share with (some) animals exposure 
to changes in the environment by which we are affected, animals cannot be said to enjoy 
their outer experience in the way that we do. A mark of this enjoyment would be, I take 
it, the fact that, unlike the macaque, the child washing potatoes is not only copying the 
activity of its parents but entering into self-conscious practices of representation and 
participation in community. It is not, on McDowell’s account, that animals are automata, 
but the nature of their experience is vastly different from that of human beings because it 
is not structured by the space of reasons. The implication is that that structuring is already 
there in experience for the human being (it is an already-structured experience to which 
the child is introduced), though whether or not an individual will be fully alert to this will 
depend in part upon the level of her Bildung. In developing this idea, McDowell makes 
reference to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s ‘remarkable description of the difference between a 
merely animal mode of life, in an environment, and a human mode of life, in the world’ 
(p. 115). The force of this contrast is to show that a life not structured by the space of 
reasons is lived not in the world but in an environment or habitat. In significant respects 
this recognition constitutes the culmination of McDowell’s argument in that the space of 
reasons, in the light of which specific experiences are constituted, now comes to be 
understood in terms of an idea of the world itself.  
A further consequence emerges from this. This is, once again following Gadamer, 
that the world is to be understood as inseparable from ideas of language and tradition. 
The concluding words of the main part of McDowell’s text (the sixth of the lectures) 
state: 
 
The feature of language that really matters is rather this: that a natural language, 
the sort of language into which human beings are first initiated, serves as a 
repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a 
reason for what. The tradition is subject to modification by each generation that 
inherits it. Indeed, a standing obligation to engage in critical reflection is part of 
the inheritance. . . But if an individual human being is to realise her potential of 
taking her place in that succession, which is the same thing as acquiring a mind, 
the capacity to think and act intentionally, at all, the first thing that needs to 
happen is for her to be initiated into a tradition as it stands (p. 126). 
 
It is this emphasis on tradition and world that marks the highpoint of the account that 
McDowell musters against the pressures of the dualism of reason and nature. In resisting 
that pressure he has, in a sense, been seeking to overcome those aspects of the 
philosophical background from which he comes, and by which he continues to find 
himself confronted, in that he sees that line of philosophical thought as in some respects 
moribund: he wants to protect us from a further ‘outbreak of philosophy’, to ‘stop this 
kind of philosophy before it begins’ (p. 183). 
Notwithstanding the cogent and, in some ways, compelling nature of Rödl’s 
criticisms, my own sense is that the broad lines of the argument from McDowell and 
Bakhurst are persuasive enough. Yet the manner of its pursuit, and indeed its very 
starting point, leave a number of questions unanswered. In the next section I detail some 
doubts.  
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Being in the world 
Let me begin by drawing attention to various ways in which McDowell’s starting point in 
the discussion relies on ideas that are distinctively technical: the realm of law, the space 
of reasons and experience itself. 
 Early in the book, and in keeping with the tradition, experience is understood in 
terms of impressions made on sensibility. This is a technical usage, being plainly at odds 
with the way that ‘experience’ is commonly used. ‘Experience’ is a notoriously slippery 
word, but it is only in philosophy that it is used in quite this way. The usage is set up in 
terms of the presumption of a dichotomy between receptivity and spontaneity, which, at 
the start, is taken as axiomatic. The dangers of a reductionism where experience is 
understood primarily in terms of the deliverances of sense become plain enough, and 
McDowell’s argument adroitly moves away from these. It moves towards an enriching of 
the notion of experience, especially through the recognition that the space of reasons goes 
all the way down. In the end the notion of experience (and of the space of reasons) is 
broadened in the light of its dependence upon the concept of world. All of this seems 
right, but the moves that are needed in order to demonstrate this are made more complex 
as a result of the technical understanding of experience that is adopted at the outset. It is 
worth acknowledging, moreover, the way that a residue of the metaphysics of res extensa 
and res cogitans is found in any crude contrasting of experience with thought. In fact, as 
McDowell helps to show, experience necessarily involves thought, but so too it is 
important to recognise that thinking is experience as well: when as an adult, in vacant and 
in pensive mood, Wordsworth lies on his couch and recalls his delight in rushing through 
the woods as a boy, these thoughts are more properly the content of his experience than 
are the deliverances of sense; while, conversely, that boyish experience, always more 
than animal delight, was itself surely structured early on by fantasies of adventure—at 
least, by something more than receptivity.  
The idea of the realm of law also is problematic insofar as it harbours a 
contradiction. If the space of reasons goes all the way down, this must condition our 
experience of the realm of law no less. Or, to phrase this in stronger terms, there could be 
no experience of the realm of law that was not already within the space of reasons. 
Without its connection with the space of reasons it would be literally inconceivable. This 
is not for a moment to deny that human beings are vulnerable to changes in the 
environment over which they have no control and that they may not understand. But it is 
to reaffirm the insights of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, to the effect that for 
something to count as an object of experience or thought it must be subject to public 
criteria. Wittgenstein’s conception of criteria is broader and more language-sensitive than 
is the space of reasons, but the crucial point remains: the realm of law, insofar as it is 
conceivable by human beings, is subject to the space of reasons. This is not, to make the 
point in different terms, to make the absurd claim that if there were no human beings 
nothing would happen! It is to say that it is impossible to conceive of those happenings 
other than from a human point of view (and so, that any account of such happenings must 
be undertaken in human terms). This extends to the conceiving of entities in the world 
and of causal relations between them.  
The space of reasons, a pivotal notion for the argument, presents problems of 
more wide-ranging kinds, and in my view it suffers from being excessively cerebral. 
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There is an over-emphasis on the use of concepts and an under-sensitivity to other ways 
in which human behaviour can be rational. While there was reason initially to follow 
Rödl, Bakhurst and McDowell in their use of this terminology, it is time now for it to be 
disturbed – initially by way of two contrasts. 
A first contrast that needs to be drawn is with the Wittgensteinian idea of rule-
following and ‘knowing how to go on’. The significance of this extends from the most 
elevated to the most basic aspects of human experience. Thus, the practice of sitting on a 
chair is eminently part of the rational behaviour of human beings, but it is not clear that 
this is well described in terms of the application of concepts or of the space of reasons. Of 
course, in special circumstances—the occurrence of persistent neck-pain perhaps—it can 
become something we reason about, but normally such activity is woven seamlessly into 
the background of what we are doing. Where it does become an object of our direct 
attention, there will always (still) be something else that hides from conceptualisation in 
the background of ongoing coping. Hence, the nomenclature of ‘concepts’ and ‘reasons’ 
is overplayed, with the result that an excessively cerebral emphasis is given to what is at 
the heart of human experience. 
A second contrast is to be drawn between emphasis on concepts and emphasis on 
language, and here once again the former has the effect of weakening the case that is 
being made. Something along these lines appears to be conceded in the final lecture in 
Mind and World. McDowell writes: ‘In these lectures I have concerned myself with 
thought; I have tried to describe a way of conceiving how thought bears on the world that 
would be immune to some familiar philosophical anxieties. And so far I have scarcely 
mentioned language’ (p. 124). The framing of this acknowledgement is worthy of note, 
but we need to proceed carefully here if this picturing of philosophy’s relation to 
language is to emerge clearly. In what is after all a very short paragraph, McDowell is 
considering how far the argument presented in the series of lectures has departed from 
analytical philosophy—specifically, from analytical philosophy as characterised by 
Michael Dummett, in which preoccupation with language is indeed taken as a defining 
feature: ‘For Frege, as for all subsequent analytical philosophers,’ Dummett writes, ‘the 
philosophy of language is the foundation of all other philosophy because it is only by the 
analysis of language that we can analyse thought’ (Dummett, 1978, pp. 442, quoted in a 
footnote in McDowell, 1996, p. 124). Dummett himself focuses on two ‘principal 
functions’ of language, as a means of communication and as a vehicle for concepts, 
neither of which should be taken as primary, he asserts, as both are fundamental. While 
McDowell does not, of course, deny the importance of these facets of language, he 
distances himself from Dummett’s account by emphasising that what really matters is 
that language is a repository of tradition, ‘a store of historically accumulated wisdom 
about what is a reason for what’ (p. 126). It is acknowledgment of this inheritance of 
tradition in the acquisition of language, not the recognition of its communication 
functions, that is important. It is this that helps to dispel the sense of mysteriousness that 
otherwise attaches to the transformation from mere animal to human being. According 
this importance to language - however late in the series of lectures - constitutes 
McDowell’s ‘way of accepting the basic tenet of analytic philosophy’, albeit that this is at 
‘some distance from any Dummett considers’ (p. 125).  
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But how satisfactory is this picture? It is instructive in this context to consider 
McDowell’s response to a challenge along the lines I am advancing that is found in 
Rüdiger Bubner’s ‘Bildung and Social Nature’ (Bubner, 2002). McDowell writes: 
 
I do not understand why Bubner suggests that there is an opposition between 
‘Gadamer’s hermeneutic conception’ and ‘the standard conviction of the analytic 
school, that is, the basic explanatory power of language’. Michael Dummett 
defines analytic philosophy in terms of the thesis that the philosopher of thought 
should be a philosopher of language. I do not object to the thesis, as Bubner 
implies. I object to the way Dummett recommends it. . . The upshot is a somewhat 
Gadamerian vindication of what Dummett identifies as the basic tenet of analytic 
philosophy. Indeed a conviction of the basic explanatory power of language seems 
appropriately attributable to the author of Part Three of Truth and Method. It is 
Gadamer who says ‘man’s relation to the world is absolutely and fundamentally 
verbal in nature’ (McDowell, 2002, pp. 475-476). 
 
The supposed resolution of the opposition here echoes the Gadamerian note that 
McDowell strikes at the end of the lectures in Mind and World, which purports to express 
the horizon constituted by tradition with the formulation: ‘Initiation into a language is 
initiation into a going conception of the space of reasons’ (McDowell, 1996, p. 184). But 
is this quite what Gadamer has in mind? And how far is it consistent with the 
Wittgensteinian insistence that there are a great many things that we do with language? 
The fundamentally ‘verbal’ nature of the human being’s relation to the world is not 
exhausted by language’s ‘explanatory power’! It would perhaps become apparent, if we 
were to step back a little and take a broader perspective, that the question of language’s 
place in philosophy is a contemporary expression of the ancient quarrel between 
philosophy and literature; we might think of the story of this quarrel as entering, in early 
analytic philosophy at least, a particularly cantankerous phase, with the subordination of 
language to logic, as is found, for example, in Bertrand Russell’s theory of descriptions. 
Wittgenstein comes to the view that the most that can be said is that logic is constructed 
out of language. Such a move, which unseats the prevailing metaphysics, is iterated 
throughout ordinary language philosophy. Moreover, we might place the present 
discussion, given a further take on this, within the rift in philosophy that emerges in the 
wake of Kant, but with the recognition that the quarrel is preserved more clearly in the 
analytic development of the subject than in, say, the hermeneutic tradition or in 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche or Heidegger. On the face of it, the gestures towards the 
connections between tradition and language that, following Gadamer, are made by 
McDowell are indeed very much to be welcomed, but the placing of language in relation 
to philosophy via Dummett creates an odd disjunction in the argument. McDowell’s 
acknowledgement of his difficulty in understanding the ‘opposition between “Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic conception”’ and ‘the standard conviction of the analytic school, that is, the 
basic explanatory power of language’, does nothing to allay doubts along these lines. 
Hence, these gestures towards language and tradition, such as they are, are scarcely likely 
to dislodge the conception of concepts and reasons that has dominated the account. 
As I have already indicated, a proper suspicion of the technical nature of the 
concepts that are the starting-point of the argument (experience, the realm of law, the 
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space of reasons) would have made the move towards the richer, more holistic conception 
of world all the more natural. The book might then have begun where it ends. So why is it 
that the turn to Gadamer comes so late? 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method was originally published in German in 1960, and 
so, when McDowell wrote Mind and World, it was hardly new on the scene. In a sense 
the way is laid for the reading of Gadamer by the recognition, in the work of McDowell 
and in that of his colleague Robert Brandom, of the importance of Hegel, though 
McDowell’s reference to that philosopher tends to be comparatively slight. Why, one 
wonders, does Mind and World not show greater faith in its inheritance of Wittgenstein, 
whose thoughts are summoned occasionally but filtered through the framework of 
analysis in such a manner as to deny the ways that they might have been enlisted at its 
starting point? Why, given the text’s acknowledgement of the influence of Richard Rorty, 
and given Rorty’s considerable success in renewing interest in John Dewey, is the work 
of Dewey not acknowledged, for this too would have taken the ground away from under 
the feet of the opening chapters—with arguments prepared more than half a century 
before? And why, given the critical importance of Gadamer, and of his account of world 
in particular, is Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, enormously influential for Gadamer 
as for so much Continental thought, not allowed to cast light on the problems being 
addressed? Being and Time, let us recall, was first published (in German) in 1927. Let me 
concentrate on the example of Heidegger as, in relation to the specific lines of 
McDowell’s argument, it is perhaps the most telling. 
We have seen how important the idea of world becomes for McDowell. The more 
or less phenomenological account that Heidegger develops in Being and Time depends, 
holistically, upon a notion of world that is especially rich and that contrasts with the idea 
of a mere environment—precisely the contrast that Gadamer exploits. A proper 
understanding of experience, and of its being pervaded by those conceptual linkages that 
are the space of reasons, is shown by McDowell to require a similarly rich conception of 
world. Impingements on sensibility are not to be understood in isolated terms but against 
the background of those linkages. In this sense the notion of world has a priority, as the 
always presupposed background to specific experience. Heidegger’s method of 
elaborating this, in the early stages of Being and Time, involves revealing those 
existential structures that connect us in meaningful relationships of ongoing coping, 
where our use of things relates to ‘equipmental-wholes’, in purposive, necessarily 
meaningful activity.   
A specific moment in the exposition of Heidegger’s phenomenology is perhaps 
specially worthy of note, for the terseness of what is said undermines at a stroke the 
traditional metaphysics that is McDowell’s starting point. Thus, in response to Kant’s 
lament that it is a scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general that there is still 
no proof of an external world, Heidegger retorts that the ‘scandal’ is not that this proof 
has yet to be given, but that ‘such proofs are expected and attempted again and again’ 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 249). But let us say a little more about how he reaches this position. 
Elaborating on the nature of our multiple involvements in the world, Heidegger claims to 
have avoided what are in effect the poles of the oscillation that McDowell seeks to 
overcome. The existential ontology that Heidegger develops might be said to accord with 
naturalism of a kind to the extent that it does not deny that there are entities present at 
hand; it does not deny that there are objects in the world; and it is attentive to things as 
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things! Heidegger formulates his target instead in terms of what he calls ‘realism’: his 
position differs in principle from every kind of philosophically realist (or, say, 
metaphysical) ‘position’: 
 
for realism holds that the Reality of the ‘world’ not only needs to be proved but 
also is capable of proof. In the existential assertion both of these positions are 
directly negated. But what distinguishes this assertion from realism altogether, is 
the fact that in realism there is a lack of ontological understanding. Indeed realism 
tries to explain Reality ontically by Real connections of interaction between things 
that are Real (p. 251). 
 
Idealism is taken by Heidegger to fare rather better. But if the idealist thesis is to remain 
cogent, ‘the ontological analysis of consciousness itself is prescribed as an inevitable 
prior task’. Only because Being is ‘in the consciousness’ can we also understand and 
conceptualise ‘such characteristics of Being as independence, the “in-itself”, and Reality 
in general. Only because of this are “independent” entities, as encountered within-the-
world, accessible to circumspection’ (ibid.). As Heidegger will later develop this thought, 
there is a mutual appropriation of ‘man’ and world through language. There is a fit 
between our ways of thinking and the contents of our thoughts, and this is generated 
through the nature of our needs and our purposive behaviour. It is on the strength of, and 
out of, this holistic being in the world that more abstract or theoretical forms of thought 
become possible, including such abstract thought as that of the realm of law. 
Hubert Dreyfus’s celebrated exegesis of Heidegger’s thought has been the basis of 
a contestation of McDowell’s views in ways that have become well known, especially in 
conjunction with the idea that emphasis on the space of reasons obscures the part played 
in human life by ongoing coping, an expression that has already been given some 
prominence. McDowell’s response, with which Bakhurst concurs, has been to the effect 
that his account of the conceptual extends beyond what is consciously articulated and into 
the activity Dreyfus has in mind. But the extension ‘downwards’ of the space of reasons, 
which is the substance of McDowell’s defence, seems to me once again a manifestation 
of the reduction of the verbal to the giving of explanations. Hence, my remarks above 
indicate some sympathy with Dreyfus’s criticism, and yet I have found reason to dissent 
from Dreyfus and not just in matters of detail.1 
Dreyfus’s  reading of Heidegger was shaped early on by the work of his fellow 
doctoral student Samuel Todes. This background of influence is generously 
acknowledged in Dreyfus’s introduction to Todes’s excellent Body and World (2001), 
which was published posthumously, some decades after the 1963 dissertation that was its 
origin. Todes’ phenomenological approach is informed particularly by the work of 
Merleau-Ponty and Kant, and the abiding emphasis of his book is, precisely, on the 
fundamental role of ongoing coping in the human condition – an emphasis that becomes 
familiar enough, as we have seen, in the sustained reading of Heidegger that Dreyfus has 
provided. These accounts are apt to foreground qualities that we in some sense share with 
animals; and such qualities are then understood as somehow more basic. In the explicitly 
architectural conception that is developed, ongoing skilled coping figures as the ground 
floor of the edifice, with the upper storeys, which rest on this foundation, given substance 
by self-consciously constructed social institutions and, at a higher level still, by such 
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matters as art and religion. And the whole is governed, so it seems, by an economy of 
desire and satisfaction. My objections to the position advanced in these texts are of two 
main kinds. In the first place, it relies on a kind of foundationalism, as the architectural 
imagery readily reveals. In the second, it is steeped in a kind of naturalism – to be 
specific, an economy of desire and satisfaction. I take these two features to be vulnerable 
to criticisms along Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian lines. The force of such criticism is 
to reverse the direction of dependence – that is, so to speak, to subvert the architecture: it 
is only in the light of the upper floors of the building that the nature and character of 
those below can be understood; it is only in virtue of those ‘higher’ values that the 
‘lower’ aspects of human lives have the character that they do. This may look like a 
variant on the claim that the space of reasons extends downwards to our ongoing coping, 
but the emphasis on language as something broader than explanation reveals a more 
diverse and complex picture. Second nature is there from the start. It conditions the world 
into which the baby comes: the experience of a baby being suckled by a mother is 
different from that of a baby suckled by a machine.   
 Dreyfus has acknowledged his failure, at least in his earlier exegesis, to attend to 
the later parts of Being and Time, which foreground the theme of mortality and without 
which the sense of the earlier pages of that text is seriously distorted. This avoidance was 
occasioned by his sense of those passages as, so he puts it, something of an existentialist 
embarrassment. One consequence of this is an over-emphasis on, or mischaracterisation 
of, ongoing coping: it is not the ground floor of being in the world. Another is a 
celebration of notions of flow and harmony, which then become amplified in Dreyfus’s 
reading of Heidegger’s later work. The result is a Californian Heidegger. There is a loss 
of the sense of the human condition as unheimlich—as uncanny or not-at-home—and of 
its constitution as ‘ecstatic’, which is to say not purely present or self-contained. Such 
characteristics are plainly at odds with modern naturalism, and they pull strongly against 
the disentanglements it indulges.   
The suspicion of the ‘disentangling manoeuvre’ of which Putnam speaks—with 
its splitting up of thick ethical predicates into a value-free ‘cognitive’ component and a 
cognition-free ‘emotive’ component—is, then, ruled out in advance in the very different 
metaphysics that Heidegger’s thought generates. Hence, the exposure of the manoeuvre 
occurred rather earlier than Putnam suggests. Indeed it is already there in Nietzsche, and 
in Emerson and Thoreau before him.2 In McDowell’s own words there is the occasional 
suggestion of regret that the tradition of philosophy he writes within had not been open 
earlier to such thoughts. Man and World was described by Richard Rorty as ‘path-
breaking’, and the extent to which McDowell succeeds in bringing light to these thickets 
of argument is certainly to be admired, but one might wish that this had been done with a 
more open eye to the wider philosophical landscape—with a greater appreciation, that is, 
of ‘different insights from different sources’, in Putnam’s words. 
I am left with the feeling that Mind and World is a powerful intellectual 
achievement, in which a highly intelligent philosopher manoeuvres his way out of the 
impasses to which philosophy has led. Wittgenstein says words to the effect that our 
thinking sometimes ties us up in knots and that sometimes the movements that need to be 
made in order to untie the knots are more complicated than those that tied them.3 Beyond 
this artistry exemplified in the precision of McDowell’s argument and expression, 
however, there is, in Wittgenstein, a sense of something else at stake: indeed, it may seem 
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that Wittgenstein unravels the knots only to (allow himself to) become caught up in them 
again. Where, then, we must ask, does that lead? 
 
Re-enchantment and disappointment 
At various moments McDowell points to the sense of compulsion there is about the 
arguments in question, as though they were motivated by deeper anxieties, registering a 
fear that, as I noted above, we are ‘simply out of touch with the rest of reality’ 
(McDowell, 1996, p. xiii). In this respect the book’s pondering of how it is that 
spontaneity can connect with the deliverances of receptivity might be said to be a 
manifestation of scepticism, where this is to be seen not primarily or exclusively as an 
epistemological problem but rather as a manifestation of what it is in the human condition 
that—continually, compulsively, as it were—calls itself into question. This is to touch on 
the line of thought that Stanley Cavell has sustained in his writings—not least in his 
readings of Wittgenstein and of Emerson and Thoreau (see, for example, Cavell, 1979, 
1981, 1990). 
 Elaborating on Wittgenstein’s account of following a rule, within philosophy and 
across the broader reach of human experience, Cavell attempts to diagnose that human 
tendency to seek something beyond the criteria that are ordinarily available to us, as if 
there were something necessarily deficient or disappointing in the circumstances of our 
lives. It is easy to see a manifestation of this within educational practice where the 
ordinary judgements of the teacher are disparaged in favour of what is supposedly the 
greater rigour of objective testing. Cavell sees our (moral) progress as depending not 
exactly on our overcoming this persistent doubt, but on our learning to understand and to 
live with it—not simply to brush it aside, for it will surely return, but not to be its captive. 
This makes possible the realisation of a partial re-enchantment that is faithful to the 
conditions of our ordinary lives and learning. It eludes the excesses of Romanticism, 
‘crazily nostalgic’ as these sometimes became in their reaction against disenchantment, 
and is patiently attentive to the realities of our being in the world: there is an 
acknowledgement that values inhere in the world and that our sense of this will 
sometimes falter. While it is, in fact, a classic Romantic text, Coleridge’s The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner, that prompts one of Cavell’s most poignant expressions of scepticism’s 
existential importance and of what it is (partly) to emerge from its grip (Cavell, 1988), it 
was, nevertheless and by contrast, on his view, part of the achievement of the American 
writers, Emerson and Thoreau, that they succeeded in providing an account of our lives 
that deviated from Romanticism, that was free from nostalgia, but that could still envision 
our world as partly enchanted (see, for example, Cavell, 1981, 1990; Standish, 2003, 
2004, 2006).  
False re-enchantment is a standing temptation, then, in familiar passages of 
Romanticism, in the recurrent inflations of Heidegger’s writing, and in Californian 
economies of satisfaction. It threatens also in educational policy and practice, steeped as 
it is at present in a kind of nihilism. I take examples of false reanimation to be found 
amongst the following: in over-anxious attempts to reintroduce ‘values’ into the 
curriculum; in the self-referential theorisation of certain forms of qualitative research 
(e.g., Denzin and Lincoln); and in overly emphatic specifications of aims and objectives, 
with the possibilities of a kind of idolatry that these bring (see Standish, 1999). Living 
well with our disappointment in criteria points to the best ways in which more cogent and 
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properly meaningful practice might be generated. It points to the ways in which the 
muted re-enchantment of the world can be realised.  
 With these thoughts, let us return to Rödl. 
 
The actualisation of education 
As we saw at the start, Rödl is provoked especially by the suggestion that baby 
human beings are ‘mere animals’, subsequently to be transformed through a process of 
education or Bildung. The vehemence of his response is felt in his demonstration that, in 
contrast to the merely animal, the capacity for reason is there already in the child. But 
how are we to view the alleged error in McDowell and Bakhurst? Is the reference to 
‘mere animals’  a structural weakness or an expression of more contextual significance? 
Might it, for example, be seen rather as a rhetorical move, designed to point up a 
difference that familiar accounts from developmental psychology sometimes underplay? 
We surely do not imagine that McDowell or Bakhurst would treat a dead baby as they 
might a dead cat or rat. Nor wouldthey be persuaded that their differentiation in this 
respect was merely a matter of superstition. So what turns on their use of the phrase, and 
what is achieved by its repudiation? A similar question might be raised about ‘nature’—
inevitably a problem term, especially for the being whose nature is convention. Are there 
two natures, then, or just one? What is clear is that all the main parties to the present 
discussion join in the rejection of modern naturalism, where this is understood to involve 
the separation of fact and value and the assumption that values are essentially 
‘subjective’. Is what separates Rödl from McDowell and Bakhurst partly, then, just an 
issue of terminology? Rödl’s view is plainly that there is more at stake: to see a 
separation into two natures involves a misunderstanding of the nature of human being, 
which must primarily be understood in terms of its form, incorporating those elements 
that are actual and those that are potential.It is not clear to me how this issue might be 
resolved, but I do think that progress can be made more generally in relation to three 
aspects of the discussion: first, by seeking a new angle on the idea of a second nature; 
next, by addressing more directly the ideas of reason, education, and autonomy; and, 
finally, by drawing out the significance of the themes of language and world. 
Rödl does not disagree with McDowell and Bakhurst that something of crucial 
importance happens as the child is exposed to the influence of adults. It is through this 
that she starts to reason, and this is so whether or not this is, on Rödl’s view, the 
actualisation of a power already there or, on McDowell’s and Bakhurst’s, the acquisition 
of something new (reason) on the strength of certain developing capacities in the child 
(sensibilities and behavioural responses). It is not clear to me why change of so profound 
a kind should not be seen as ‘transformational’, a word that Rödl wants to resist. The 
caterpillar is to be understood in terms of the form of the butterfly, but it surely has its 
transformations. If in the human context there is a rhetorical charge to ‘transformation’, 
then why necessarily resist this? In a more literary philosophical vein, Thoreau makes 
much of the seasonal transformations, the rebirths, through which animals go, with the 
loon bird losing its feathers, the snake sloughing its skin; and he sees it as crucial that, 
when the time has come, human beings go through their own non-seasonal changes. At 
another point in Walden he speaks of his bathing in the lake as a daily baptism—as if we 
should continually be prepared to let go of something to which we cling too much and be 
ready for something new, as it were in a series of little rebirths. And elsewhere again in 
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that text, he writes of our acquiring not just a mother tongue but—at some later stage and 
perhaps in an ongoing, continuing way—also a ‘father tongue’ (see Standish, 2006). The 
phrase connotes a relation to our language in which we do not inhabit it seamlessly and 
without self-consciousness but where we can be brought up short by a word or a phrase, 
where we are called upon to look again at that phrase’s significance and effects, and 
where at times we are not sure how to go on. This is crucial to our developing thought 
and judgement. Such moments, absent in the exchange of signs amongst animals (which 
do indeed seem to work more or less reliably, more or less like tools), are the means of 
imagination and the opening of culture. Moreover, it would be quite wrong to think of 
this acquisition of the father tongue as some kind of adolescent coming of age, for in a 
sense it is there from the start, in the child’s first experimentations and play with words. 
In The Claim of Reason (1979), in the ‘Excursus on Wittgenstein’s vision of language’, 
Cavell illustrates this with some brilliance. The child hears the word ‘pumpkin’, which 
connects somehow with that large orange thing that is there in the shops around 
Hallowe’en, but then wonders just how this relates to Mr Popkin who lives next door and 
whether it is a pumpkin because it is somehow pumped up. Open possibilities of 
association and connection are there already in the kinds of signs that human beings use. 
In consequence, entry into language is at the same time an opening for leaps of the 
imagination. The disagreements between rule and practice that Rödl identifies so 
evocatively in children’s play are but a part of this broader, necessary aspect of language. 
So the point of this extended example is to show how there is a kind of secondness in 
this: words seem, as it were, to fold back on themselves or turn in new directions. This 
suggests a trajectory that is far from unilinear, that is not reducible simply to first and 
second developmental stages, but that is, in some sense at least, transformational in kind. 
To identify these matters is to show something of what might matter in education. 
It is for good reason that the account of education in Rödl’s paper is thin, in that this is 
not where its main focus lies. But it is worth drawing something out from this, for what is 
said here affects the conception of autonomy with which his discussion is engaged. Rödl 
is concerned with an underdescription at the most basic level—that of the baby; my 
concern is with the larger picture of reason that informs this. 
The power of reason already in the child is actualised by her being brought into 
the habits and reasonings of the adults around her. Not to say more than this, however, is 
to work with a characterisation of reasoning that is decidedly loose and a characterisation 
of autonomy in only the ‘minimal’ sense.4 The habits and reasonings of the adults to 
which the child is exposed may be intellectually restricted or morally objectionable, but 
they will still serve to actualise her powers of reason. Fagin’s ‘school’ for pickpockets (in 
Oliver Twist), a course in astrology or introduction to the rules of quidditch (in Harry 
Potter) would all seem sufficient. Yet none will qualify as education in any responsible 
sense, nor will they lay the way for any ideal of autonomy. They involve reason to the 
extent that reasons and explanations are advanced, but they fall well short of any more 
normatively rich conception, of which any credible conception of education surely stands 
in need. My sense is that such a conception cannot be gained without reference to 
content. Reason without content is empty and blind. 
Now, as we saw earlier, McDowell’s remarks regarding language as a repository 
of tradition support the idea that the space of reasons that the child enters is substantively 
rich—rich with traditions of thought and judgement, and with the topography of 
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discipline and practice. Bakhurst’s suggestion that the notion of initiation warrants further 
scrutiny—whether into the forms of knowledge, worthwhile pursuits, or the conversation 
of mankind—is, then, very much to the point. It is one of the achievements of The 
Formation of Reason that, in recognising the need for greater attention to the idea of 
initiation, it expands and enriches the notion of Bildung, which McDowell engages only 
in formalistic terms. In my Preface to the book, I drew attention to its appreciation of the 
embeddedness of Bildung in the facts of human life—of human finitude and sensibility, 
of human beings as subject to emotion and mood. This is elaborated in some detail 
through revealing practical examples, drawn especially from music and the arts, in which 
the significance of specific subject-matter comes to the fore. When it comes to the bigger 
picture, the account of Bildung that is generated is historically rich: with roots in 
Renaissance humanism and ultimately Ancient Greek thought, and with strong 
connotations of character formation, it is explicated as a process of self-making. Such a 
vision of freedom and reason gives purchase to the ideal of autonomy through the 
learner’s growing acquaintance with substantive traditions of practice. It is, then, 
incumbent upon educators to ensure that this process is informed by plausible 
conceptions of the good, Bakhurst’s account of which is resolutely affirmative and 
pluralistic.  
Bakhurst finds connections between his own project and aspects of 
constructionism, but also with the work of R.S. Peters, Paul Hirst, and Robert Dearden. In 
the course of comparing his position with the latter group of philosophers, however, he 
identifies some significant differences, all of which help to clarify what he takes to be at 
stake. One such difference arises from his questioning how far conceptual analysis can 
take us in those questions in the philosophy of mind that are at the heart of the present 
symposium. While I am sympathetic to this criticism, I believe he does not sufficiently 
acknowledge the extent to which the main representatives of the London School were 
engaged in filling out some more normatively rich account of what reason, education, and 
autonomy might require and, hence, what initiation might amount to. In this it is 
important that they went well beyond what sometimes seemed their official methodology, 
and of course it is right to invoke the name of Michael Oakeshott as a key influence in 
this.5 What is interesting here particularly is the fact that the elaboration of reason in 
these ways cannot proceed very far in formal terms. Reason becomes something with a 
content, and evaluations of that content are internal to a better elaborated account. The 
more this content is emphasised, the more significant come to seem the particular kinds 
of habit and reasoning to which the child is exposed and the objects to which her 
attention is drawn: the gap between the power of reasoning in the child and its 
actualisation yawns more widely; and in the light of the continual traversing of this gap 
through education, it seems all the more reasonable to speak of transformation. 
In some ways these considerations prompt the thought that the issue between Rödl 
and, especially, Bakhurst might be rendered in terms of the relative weight they give to 
the metaphysical and the ethical, a persistent question for the present symposium. 
Questions concerning the quality of the habits and reasonings into which children are 
inducted look like ethical rather than metaphysical matters. But I do not think this 
disentangling manoeuvre will do or that it would satisfy either of the parties concerned. 
They are right, in my view, to see these issues of mind and world as at the heart of 
education; and education itself, it can be added, is internal to the way the world becomes. 
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My inclination has been to insert questions of language more forcefully into the 
discussion of mind, world and the formation of reason, and I have referred at times to 
Wittgenstein. But, as a tail-piece, I would like to bring to the discussion a telling criticism 
of Wittgenstein, which is particularly worthy of attention here. Rush Rhees, 
Wittgenstein’s student and friend, argued that, for all the meticulous consideration of the 
variety of things we do with words, Wittgenstein did not take seriously enough the 
centrality in language of having something to say. Let me crystallise this by way of an 
anecdote, which I have elaborated in relation to these thoughts elsewhere (Standish, 
2014). Imagine: You are sitting at your desk at home working, and a small child, not 
quite two years old, comes hurriedly into the room. He is distressed, struggling to say 
something, barely capable of finding any words at all, and you listen, discerning only 
fragments of sense. But, it is clear, he is imploring you to listen, repeating these same 
sounds excitedly, and finally they coalesce in a sentence you can understand: ‘Ella put the 
dinosaur down the toilet.’ Now dinosaurs, toilets, and big sisters (Ella) figure large in the 
mind of a two-year old, and it is plain that he is struggling to measure the gravity of what 
has happened. He has come to you, it turns out, not to seek your help in rescuing the 
dinosaur, for his mother, you soon work out, has already done that. He has come to you to 
tell you what has happened. He is registering from your reaction the importance of what 
has happened, and in so doing finding out something about what the world is like. But he 
is also, in finding something to say, discovering the world as something we can speak 
about and discovering himself as having something to say. These are crucial steps in 
discovering what the world is. 
In his remarks about very small children, Rödl shows with some brilliance the 
ways that they enter into community with adults, and he is specific about what this 
entails. In particular he shows how the development of the general concept involves 
representation and the awareness that something is represented. This is true for the child 
before she can speak, and it is obvious that this ability accelerates spectacularly as she 
comes more fully into language. This is a highly important corrective to any assumption 
that language and the range of human gesture are to be understood exclusively or even 
primarily in functional or transactional terms. The realisation that things can be 
represented and that she may have something she wants to represent are breakthrough 
moments for the child, and they will be crucial not only to how she subsequently 
develops but to how the world comes to light. If the cow carries its environment in its 
stomach, the human being has the world in its tongue. 
  
  
                                                          
Notes 
1 I elaborated these views in an invited response to Dreyfus at a conference in Tokyo in 2003 (Standish, 
2003a; see also Smeyers, Smith, and Standish, 2006, ch, 7). 
2 Of course the list might be extended back through history, taking in Hegel and Spinoza, and elements of 
Greek thought. 
3 Wittgenstein (1993, p. 193) writes: ‘Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking; hence its results must 
be simple, but its activity is as complicated as the knots that it unravels’.  
4 The contrast appealed to here is between miminal autonomy, as that normal, basic capacity for 
exercising judgement in virtue of which individuals can reasonably be praised or blamed for their actions, 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and the ideal of autonomy (sometimes called ‘rational autonomy’), according to which a person’s life 
would be lived in accordance with principles legislated by their own nature and in the light of reasoned 
judgement.  
5 For further discussion, see Bakhurst and Fairfield (2016). My own chapter in this volume, ‘A 
Turn in the Conversation’, expands on some of the points made here.  
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